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Abstract
This research applies a discrete-time Markov-modulated 
model to default probability estimation and adapts it to Mer-
ton’s contingent claims approach, backing the hypothesis 
that a regime-switching framework which allows for struc-
tural shifts can substantially improve the underestimation of 
default probabilities associated with the Merton structural 
model. The modeling apparatus is applied to sovereign risk 
proving that the methodology can be tractably extended to a 
contingent claims approach, and is investigated as a follow-
up paper to an extensive methodology found in the previ-
ous edition of the Capco Journal of Financial Transformation 
(37) [Potgieter and Fusai (2013)]. CDS quotes are used to 
calibrate the regime switching model and are then used to 
estimate sovereign assets in both developed and emerging 
markets.
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Introduction
The recent credit crisis has raised the awareness of investors and regula-
tors concerning the appropriate methods for valuation, trading, and risk 
management of sovereign debt instruments. Many existing models as-
sume homogenous market conditions and incorporating changes in mar-
ket regimes or the economic environment due to a credit event appear 
difficult. This motivates the application of an appropriate valuation model 
of sovereign debt in a regime-switching framework. We consider an ex-
tension of the Merton’s contingent claims approach to the macro level, as 
discussed in Gray et al. (2007) and we allow for structural changes and 
regime-switching according to Liew and Sui (2010).
The model allows for the computation of the term structure of default 
probabilities (PDs) and it is calibrated to observed quotes of sovereign 
Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). This allows us to predict a set of observed 
economic balance sheet information including a sovereign’s asset value 
(A) and local-currency liability in foreign currency term (LCL). We use the 
proposed model on both developed and emerging markets. The eco-
nomic intuition behind the regime-switching Markov-modulated model is 
to incorporate the impact of suddenly changing macroeconomic condi-
tions on the sovereign balance sheet information. This is done by assum-
ing that the volatility of a sovereign’s asset value has switching dynamics 
and follows a finite-state discrete Markov-chain where the states of the 
chain could represent the states of the economy. The final aim of the re-
search is to establish a link between the credit market and a sovereign’s 
balance sheet and to understand if the credit market conveys useful in-
formation to predict economic balance sheet information.
Potgieter and Fusai (2013) provides the key ideas of the model, describ-
ing the process of calculating the probability of default on a N-state hid-
den Markov Model, and derives the value for a sovereign’s assets and a 
local-currency liability in foreign currency terms. The calibrated model is 
used to calculate the price of a standard European call option according 
to the contingent claim approach (CCA). The observed local-currency li-
ability (LCL) can be compared with the valuation implied in market quota-
tions through the switching regime model. This allows us to understand 
how much CDSs, conditional to the use of the proposed model, can tell 
us about the market estimate of the value of sovereign assets. In practice, 
there exist significant differences between the two. We perform a detailed 
empirical analysis on a set of countries, representative of advanced and 
emerging economies. The main conclusion it that information on LCL 
can be extracted from CDS market quotes across a variety of countries.
Extracting sovereign riskiness from a Markov-
modulated Merton model
Gray et al. (2007) extends the Merton’s Contingent Claim Approach to the 
macro level to include a sovereign balance sheet analysis. The assets of 
a sovereign for the purpose of this approach comprise foreign reserves, 
net fiscal assets, and other assets minus entities too important to fail. 
Liabilities are defined as foreign-currency denominated debt plus a local-
currency liability comprised of local-currency debt and base money. Sov-
ereign default arises when sovereign assets cannot cover the promised 
payment on foreign currency debt. The default barrier, in our framework 
the strike of the above mentioned call option, is therefore defined as the 
present value of these payments. While the liabilities are known with a 
fair degree of certainty over any given time horizon, the sovereign assets 
are more uncertain as assets may change for a large number of reasons. 
Three factors therefore drive default: the sovereign asset value, the vola-
tility of the assets, and the default barrier. The default barrier is defined as 
“senior” foreign-currency denominated debt [Crouhy et al. (2000)].
The foreign-currency debt is modeled as default-free value of debt mi-
nus an implicit put option. Local-currency liabilities are modeled as an 
implicit call option since such liability demonstrates “equity-like fea-
tures” on a sovereign balance sheet. The local-currency multiplied by 
the exchange rate is considered a market cap of the sovereign in the 
international market.
The CCA approach relies on the relationship between balance sheet en-
tries to extract an implied estimate of sovereign assets by a calibration 
procedure where the value of the local-currency liability in foreign curren-
cy terms (LCL) is a call option of the sovereign’s assets (A) with the strike 
price as the default barrier (Bf) defined as foreign-currency denominated 
debt. Instead of using balance sheet claims to predict default probabili-
ties according to a CCA model, we perform a reverse engineering pro-
cedure by filtering observed market data through the regime-switching 
model and we try to infer balance sheet information. This allows us to ap-
preciate the implied value of a sovereign’s assets relative to existing debt 
that is observable and could signal a looming credit event. A detailed 
description of the underlying mathematical framework can be found in 
Potgieter and Fusai (2013).
As detailed by Potgieter and Fusai (2013), once we have extracted the 
default probabilities from quotes on CDS spreads for different maturi-
ties, in our case 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 years, the calibration consists of 
inferring the model parameters, iteratively adjusted to best fit the market 
observed default probabilities using non-linear least-squared-error mini-
mization. Then we can use the calibrated model to infer the value of the 
sovereign assets that are otherwise unobservable. The basic structure of 
the model and formula can be found in Appendix 1.
Application to the sovereign case
This section reports the results of the empirical analysis performed in both 
developed and emerging markets for various maturities. Countries include 
South Africa, Brazil, US, Italy, and Germany. The analysis covers a window 
period which differs depending on the availability of market data.
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The data
Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) are generally issued for full range of sov-
ereign bond issues, more typically for maturities ranging from one to 10 
years. Historically, the most actively traded contracts amongst various 
sovereign issuers are for maturities T=[1 2 3 5 7 10] years to maturity. The 
CDS historical market quote series vary from country to country, depend-
ing on the earliest issue in each respective market. Emerging markets 
generally have a longer history. Though the frequency of CDS data is 
obtainable on a daily basis, given that the sovereign balance sheet data is 
available only on a quarterly basis, the calibration considers an averaged 
CDS market quote on the previous quarter to have the same frequency 
as the balance sheet data.
For the purpose of this approach, sovereign default arises when sover-
eign assets cannot sufficiently cover the promised payment on foreign-
currency denominated debt. The default barrier is therefore defined as 
the present value of these payments. The default barrier may be defined 
as a KMV-like measure (short-term debt plus one-half long-term debt 
plus interest payments up to a certain time) or “senior” foreign-currency 
denominated debt [Crouhy et al. (2000)]. This research adopts the latter 
definition. Seniority of debt is inferred from examining the behavior of 
policymakers during stress periods. These efforts make such debt more 
senior to “junior claims” on sovereign local-currency denominated debt. 
Local currency liabilities comprising local-currency debt and base money 
are modeled as an implicit call option on a sovereign’s assets with the 
strike price as the default barrier since such liabilities demonstrate “eq-
uity-like features” on a sovereign balance sheet. The estimation of the 
sovereign unknown and unobserved asset value can be extracted from 
both the calibrated inverse leverage parameter and the observed distress 
barrier. We compare the estimation with an observed local-currency li-
ability in foreign currency terms. Expression (5) given in Appendix 1 is the 
relevant one to obtain LCL observed. The inputs require balance sheet 
data such as the base money, domestic interest rates, foreign interest 
rates, domestic currency denominated debt as the default barrier, and 
forward exchange rates. We calculate the observed local-currency liabil-
ity using a five year term.
Interest rate data include the Eonia (Euro Overnight Index Average) and 
US OIS (US Over-Night Index Swap). The Eonia is an effective overnight 
interest rate computed as a weighted average of all overnight unsecured 
lending transactions in the interbank market. It is one of the two bench-
marks (the other one being Euribor) used in the money and capital mar-
kets in the Eurozone. The US OIS is an interest rate swap that allows 
financial institutions to swap the interest rates they are paying without 
having to change the terms of contracts in place with other financial in-
stitutions. The fixed rate of OIS is considered less risky than the cor-
responding interbank rate (LIBOR), as only the net difference in interest 
rates is paid at maturity of the swap. In the United States, OIS rates are 
calculated by reference to a daily federal funds rate. For Brazil and South 
Africa, interest rates have been obtained using the zero curve as com-
puted by DataStream.
The data source for all CDS quotes and balance sheet data includes both 
Bloomberg and DataStream.
A case of South Africa
The data for South Africa includes CDS market quotes averaged on a 
given quarter for a total of 10 observations from March 2010 to June 
2012. The estimated parameters calibrated across the entire term struc-
ture on the last day of each quarter of the estimation period are presented 
in Table 1. The first column is the date when the calibration is performed. 
The second and third column present the volatility in state 1 and 2 re-
spectively, and provide an indication of how the states are defined e.g., 
“good” or “bad.” Columns four and five give indication of the probability 
of the Markov chain remaining in state 1 and probability of transitioning 
to state 1 from state 2 respectively. Column six presents the inverse of 
the leverage parameter i.e., the ratio of the sovereign asset value and the 
observed distress barrier. An obligor defaults when the value of its assets 
falls below the value of its liabilities, or equivalent when its inverse lever-
age ratio (the ratio of liabilities to assets) falls below one.
From the estimated transition probabilities, the probability that the coun-
try continues to stay in state 1 is high while the probability of a transition 
to state 2 is low. For example, consider the results on June 29, 2012, aj,i 
shows transition probability of moving from state i to state j.
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To state 1 To state 2
From state 1 0.9990 0.0010
From state 2 0.9865 0.0135
Table 2: Transition probabilities on June 29, 2012: South Africa
s1 s2 a11 a12 S/K
31/03/2010 85.01% 2.21% 0.9869 0.9891 1.89
30/06/2010 62.97% 3.52% 0.9790 0.9837 1.75
30/09/2010 71.01% 4.15% 0.9853 0.9871 1.92
31/12/2010 70.03% 10.97% 0.9863 0.9874 2.12
31/03/2011 76.19% 3.14% 0.9885 0.9883 1.91
30/06/2011 93.53% 1.46% 0.9704 0.9864 1.98
30/09/2011 86.37% 1.20% 0.9847 0.9842 2.04
30/12/2011 79.21% 2.55% 0.9774 0.9823 2.09
30/03/2012 84.58% 2.48% 0.9839 0.9863 1.91
29/06/2012 99.90% 0.27% 0.9990 0.9865 1.89
Table 1: Estimated parameters in two-state hidden Markov regime-
switching model: South Africa
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This shows that the Markov model captures the persistence in a state; 
in this case state 1. How is the state defined then? The two volatility es-
timates provide a clear indication that the level of volatility defines each 
state. Given that s1 >> s2, state 1 and state 2 therefore could be classified 
as a “volatile” or “bad” economy versus a “stable” or “good” economy 
respectively. The large difference in the volatilities of the two states may 
be attributed to the fact that the historical data used in the estimation 
period includes a period of market downturn, several corrections and a 
strong rally between October 2011 and April 2012. Volatility as measured 
by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s South African Volatility Index 
(SAVI) had increased considerably toward the end of the estimation pe-
riod, albeit below the heights of the 2008 credit crisis.
The inverse leverage ratio generally fluctuates around values not too far 
from 2. We recall that a credit event occurs as soon as the inverse le-
verage ratio approaches a value of 1. The calibrated term structure of 
probability of default (PD) is shown in Table 3. The slope of the PD curve 
reflects simply a forward expectation of how the default risk is perceived.
Brigo and Tarenghi (2005) highlight that structural models often imply un-
realistic short-term credit spreads. There is also empirical evidence that 
structural models underestimate the actual probability of default and the 
use of regime-switching model intends to improve the structural model 
[Leland (2004), Tarashev (2005), Erlwein et al. (2008)]. The calibrated results 
indicate that the model resolves the underestimation drawback and that 
the PD over short term maturities are all non-zero. Table 3 and Figure 1 
illustrate how the default probability moves over time. We observe a wave-
like behavior of the PD along the date axis, holding the maturity constant. 
The waves appear to peak around June 2010 and July 2011.
We try to understand the information conveyed by the term structure. In late 
April 2010, the Greek debt rating was decreased to “junk” status by Standard 
& Poor’s amidst fears of default by the Greek Government. Thereafter, risks 
to global financial stability eased off as the economic recovery gained steam. 
In September 2011, the Global Financial Stability Report cautioned that the 
risks to global financial stability increased substantially in prior months. 
Heavy public debt burdens and weak growth prospects in many advanced 
economies combined with a series of shocks to the global financial system 
were the culprits. Despite higher growth prospects for emerging economies, 
markets faced the risk of sharp reversals. At this stage, the crisis moved into 
its fifth year, entering into a new phase in which political differences across 
economies were impeding progress to address the legacies of the crisis. 
An on-going low interest rate environment in developed markets and high 
uncertainty drove the asset allocations of institutional investors, with a clear 
shift to safety and liquidity. Net capital flows to emerging markets such as 
South Africa remained relatively strong during the first half of 2011 although 
very volatile. This reflected higher nominal interest rates, the perception that 
currencies would appreciate, and relatively strong fundamentals.
Calibration T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 T = 7 T = 10
31/03/2010 1.90% 2.37% 2.19% 2.89% 3.68% 4.53% 5.43%
30/06/2010 2.59% 3.07% 2.24% 2.98% 3.84% 4.79% 5.82%
30/09/2010 2.10% 2.51% 2.06% 2.73% 3.50% 4.34% 5.25%
31/12/2010 2.06% 2.39% 1.88% 2.53% 3.36% 4.37% 5.54%
31/03/2011 1.40% 1.84% 1.95% 2.87% 3.83% 4.83% 5.85%
30/06/2011 1.48% 2.09% 1.49% 2.68% 3.90% 5.15% 6.43%
30/09/2011 2.70% 3.29% 3.07% 3.97% 4.98% 6.09% 7.27%
30/12/2011 2.73% 3.27% 2.55% 3.52% 4.61% 5.80% 7.06%
30/03/2012 1.82% 2.38% 2.35% 3.37% 4.46% 5.60% 6.77%
29/06/2012 1.75% 2.45% 3.50% 4.64% 5.83% 7.05% 8.30%
Table 3 – Calibrated term structure of default probabilities using regime-
switching model: South Africa
 Distress 
Barrier
Implied 
Asset 
Value
LCL 
Observed
LCL 
Estimate
(T=5)
Average 
LCL 
Estimate
31/03/2010 316,610 599,827 64,526 66,600 65,144
30/06/2010 334,956 584,993 62,147 63,232 62,314
30/09/2010 311,111 597,524 75,756 77,231 76,144
31/12/2010 299,561 634,429 81,653 82,607 81,807
31/03/2011 311,863 596,100 80,162 84,476 82,443
30/06/2011 318,272 631,165 83,871 87,120 85,209
30/09/2011 383,228 782,489 76,628 81,232 79,280
30/12/2011 390,675 814,713 82,327 85,226 83,672
30/03/2012 375,333 718,745 82,077 88,584 86,039
29/06/2012 409,865 773,502 81,336 95,011 90,597
Table 4 – Implied sovereign asset value, distress barrier and local-
currency liability (in millions USD): South Africa
Figure 1 – Calibrated term structure of default probability: South Africa
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Using the estimated parameters from the regime-switching model and 
the sovereign balance sheet data required for the contingent claim ap-
proach (CCA), an implied asset value is then computed at each estima-
tion date. Furthermore, the local-currency liabilities (LCL) estimate is 
calculated using as an input the implied asset value. We compare the 
balance sheet estimate with the observed equivalent.
The LCL component is reported for both a T = 5 year maturity and the 
LCL component averaged across all maturities T= [1 2 3 5 7 10].
Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide a visualization of the results as a time series 
of each balance sheet component. The implied sovereign asset value lies 
well above the distress value for all quarters indicating that no default 
was imminent in the estimation period, a reasonable observation given 
the default probabilities are at most below 3% for a three-year horizon. 
This is also confirmed by the inverse leverage ratio that is well above 1 as 
we have seen from Table 1. The value for the LCL estimate for five-year 
maturity tracks the observed component closely, overestimating it within 
a reasonable range, signalling the reliability of the proposed reverse en-
gineering procedure.
In order to better quantify this reliability, we next examine the explana-
tory power for the observed local-currency liability (LCL) over a T= 5 year 
maturity, using the estimated LCL obtained from the model. For this pur-
pose, we consider the following linear regression where the goodness of 
the implied LCL estimate in predicting the observed LCL is tested. The 
relationship to be estimated between the observed and estimated LCL 
is as follows:
LCLObserved = α + b ∗ LCLEstimate + ε (1)
Here α represents the intercept of the linear regression, b the slope and 
ε, the error term reflecting other factors that influence the observed local-
currency liability. The estimated relationship turns out to be:
^
LCLObserved = 17 644.63 + 0.73 ∗ LCLEstimate
with additional outputs given in Table 5.
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
α 17644.63 8123.17 2.1721 0.061613
b 0.7322 0.09948 7.3605 7.91E-05
R2= 0.87
Table 5 – Regression analysis for observed local-currency liability (in 
million USD): South Africa
A one-tailed t-statistic of 7.4 indicates significance in the estimated 
coefficients along with the low p-value << 0.05. Of some relevance is 
the high R2 value, well above 0.87, which measures how much the total 
variation of the dependent variable LCLObserved is explained by the re-
gression. This suggests that the LCLEstimate implied in the CDS quotes 
has high power in explaining the LCLObserved. On the other hand, given 
the estimated value of b lower than 1 due to the fact that LCLEstimate 
> LCLObserved, the prediction appears biased i.e., CDS market quotes 
overstate the local sovereign liabilities. 
Table 6 extends the analysis using the LCL estimates implied by different 
points of the term structure of default probabilities. The short term matur-
ities can provide an even greater predictive value of the observed value of 
LCL. In addition, the prediction extracted from the one year maturity also 
appears unbiased (αˆ = 0,bˆ =1). The result implies that the estimated LCL 
tend to capture the level of the observed balance sheet data very well.
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Figure 2 – Implied sovereign asset value versus distress barrier 
(in millions USD) – South Africa
50.000 
55.000 
60.000 
65.000 
70.000 
75.000 
80.000 
85.000 
90.000 
95.000 
100.000 
03
/2
01
0 
05
/2
01
0 
07
/2
01
0 
09
/2
01
0 
11
/2
01
0 
01
/2
01
1 
03
/2
01
1 
05
/2
01
1 
07
/2
01
1 
09
/2
01
1 
11
/2
01
1 
01
/2
01
2 
03
/2
01
2 
05
/2
01
2 
LCL estimate (T=5) 
Average LCL estimate 
LCL observed  
Figure 3 – Local-currency liability observed versus estimate 
(in millions USD: South Africa
Maturity T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 T = 7 T = 10
R2 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.80
α 0.00 275.05 11059.22 14451.81 17644.63 22212.72 29537.93
b 0.99 0.98 0.86 0.79 0.73 0.68 0.61
Table 6 – R2 measure and regression analysis of local-currency liability 
estimate across term structure: South Africa
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A case of Brazil
In the case of Brazil, the estimation period ranges from June 2005 to 
June 2012. The estimated parameters calibrated across the entire term 
structure are presented in Table 7.
The high values of a11 indicate a clear persistence in state 1, which ac-
cording to the volatility estimates, is classified as a low volatility state. 
The inverse leverage ratio varies between 1.5 and 2.4 throughout the 
estimation period, suggesting that in this period, Brazil was in quite a 
comfortable situation.
Figure 4 shows the term structure of estimated probability of defaults 
(PDs) obtained via the regime-switching model. Default probabilities have 
remained relatively stable for shorter maturities while the perceived risk 
of longer horizons has steadily decreased over the estimation period: 
the probability of default for the 10-year maturity steadily declined from 
above 15% to below 10%, fluctuating at a moderate level with the eco-
nomic environment. Moody’s and Fitch have viewed Brazil as showing 
growing economic resilience with cautious fiscal and monetary policy.
Table 8 presents the sovereign balance sheet data required for the con-
tingent claim approach (CCA) and the local-currency liabilities LCL com-
ponent, observed and estimated for a T= 5 year maturity and the coun-
terparts averaged across the entire term structure.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide a visual perspective of the quarterly time 
series of the sovereign balance sheet components. The growing eco-
nomic conditions in Brazil are evident by the rise in the indicators. The 
local-currency liabilities estimate overstates the observed value for peri-
ods prior to March 2008, proceeding to understate the observed value 
thereafter. This implies that CDS quotations, differently from South Africa, 
at first overstate and then understate local sovereign liabilities. The dis-
tress barrier remains well below the implied asset value aside from March 
2009, where a sharp drawdown is experienced. The financial fragility dis-
played here is intimately related to the probability of default which surged 
around this time period, when the US stock market reached its lowest 
point since the start of the 2008 recession.
Next, the quarterly predictive ability for the observed local-currency li-
ability (LCL) is examined in Table 9, using the estimated local-currency 
liability obtained from the model. The regression analysis provides the 
following estimated relationship:
^
LCLObserved = -8 9857.77 + 1.25 ∗ LCLEstimate
The case of Brazil differs from South Africa in that the implied estimate 
 s1 s2 a11 a12 S/K
30/06/2005 24.21% 18.65% 0.9990 0.9990 1.8290
30/09/2005 0.81% 7.95% 0.9990 0.9674 1.5049
30/12/2005 22.65% 19.52% 0.9990 0.9990 2.0049
31/03/2006 0.81% 8.76% 0.9986 0.9859 1.5035
30/06/2006 0.80% 11.30% 0.9970 0.9990 1.4981
29/09/2006 0.80% 9.34% 0.9990 0.9899 1.5017
29/12/2006 0.80% 9.60% 0.9990 0.9990 1.4982
30/03/2007 0.81% 8.38% 0.9986 0.9926 1.5013
29/06/2007 0.81% 9.18% 0.9990 0.9990 1.4985
28/09/2007 0.81% 7.27% 0.9990 0.9883 1.5027
31/12/2007 0.80% 8.98% 0.9990 0.9919 1.5003
31/03/2008 0.80% 11.50% 0.9990 0.9981 1.5015
30/06/2008 0.80% 7.18% 0.9990 0.9831 1.5022
30/09/2008 0.68% 6.59% 0.9854 0.9668 1.4369
31/12/2008 0.75% 21.05% 0.9756 0.9700 1.2733
31/03/2009 0.80% 22.04% 0.9829 0.9829 1.2643
30/06/2009 0.80% 11.49% 0.9988 0.9989 1.4965
30/09/2009 0.82% 8.03% 0.9990 0.9835 1.5013
31/12/2009 0.82% 7.38% 0.9990 0.9827 1.5025
31/03/2010 0.86% 7.79% 0.9990 0.9828 1.5022
30/06/2010 3.38% 8.90% 0.9990 0.9803 1.6681
30/09/2010 1.25% 10.03% 0.9990 0.9846 1.7390
31/12/2010 3.88% 11.59% 0.9990 0.9879 1.7863
31/03/2011 9.24% 14.71% 0.9990 0.9912 2.0130
30/06/2011 8.12% 19.37% 0.9990 0.9990 2.2920
30/09/2011 0.81% 19.85% 0.9860 0.9859 1.2963
30/12/2011 0.80% 11.54% 0.9989 0.9985 1.4964
30/03/2012 0.81% 8.16% 0.9990 0.9851 1.5015
29/06/2012 0.85% 8.96% 0.9990 0.9838 1.5018
Table 7 – Estimated parameters for Markov regime-switching model: Brazil
Figure 4 – Calibrated term structure of default probability: Brazil
73
provides an upward bias (b>1). However, R2, is still very high.
The high value of R2 suggests that the regression model of the estimated 
local-currency liability explains the level in the observed quantity rea-
sonably well. A one-tailed t-statistic of 10.8 indicates significance in the 
estimated coefficients together with a P-value < 0.05.
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The explanatory power of the estimated local-currency liability as mea-
sured by the R2 across the entire term structure is presented in Table 10. 
Its high value across maturities implies that the estimated LCL tends to 
capture the variation in the observed balance sheet data. For Brazil as 
well, predictions extracted from shorter maturities appear to have a very 
low bias.
 Distress 
Barrier
Implied 
Asset 
Value
LCL 
Observed
LCL 
Estimate
(T=5)
Average 
LCL 
Estimate
30/06/2005 191,309 572,777 275,667 303,683 296,816
30/09/2005 183,151 648,459 300,826 339,794 333,364
30/12/2005 169,450 591,055 344,974 397,900 391,717
31/03/2006 166,652 625,321 349,438 413,395 407,774
30/06/2006 156,661 564,884 369,277 443,110 437,896
29/09/2006 159,560 598,639 362,863 440,745 434,799
29/12/2006 172,589 681,523 388,391 473,197 467,351
30/03/2007 182,082 675,851 402,677 496,021 490,100
29/06/2007 191,358 882,475 432,881 531,538 525,733
28/09/2007 195,331 749,241 501,279 594,251 588,641
31/12/2007 193,219 757,899 591,676 601,720 596,871
31/03/2008 201,637 740,365 613,378 569,518 564,815
30/06/2008 205,536 754,038 696,894 573,100 569,530
30/09/2008 211,381 732,434 725,278 549,452 544,967
31/12/2008 198,340 597,776 518,923 413,486 410,399
31/03/2009 192,676 420,082 484,679 242,094 238,810
30/06/2009 198,996 712,512 553,688 524,346 521,991
30/09/2009 204,934 786,536 699,871 591,623 589,518
31/12/2009 198,192 769,321 765,835 579,311 577,473
31/03/2010 211,532 794,666 728,538 592,566 590,502
30/06/2010 228,649 888,302 781,736 670,571 668,290
30/09/2010 247,812 933,830 813,936 696,602 694,517
31/12/2010 256,804 924,062 876,930 677,673 675,660
31/03/2011 275,947 1,086,314 922,448 822,211 819,955
30/06/2011 291,648 1,143,223 1,018,431 862,636 860,418
30/09/2011 298,219 1,055,958 966,011 773,238 769,524
30/12/2011 298,204 1,193,837 874,191 833,793 830,632
30/03/2012 289,606 1,060,937 900,813 784,285 781,434
29/06/2012 287,529 1,017,470 832,855 745,029 741,555
Table 8 – Implied sovereign asset value, distress barrier and local-
currency liability (in millions USD): Brazil
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Figure 5 – Contingent claim approach (in millions USD): Brazil
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Figure 6 – Local-currency liability observed versus estimate (in millions 
USD): Brazil
Maturity T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 T = 7 T = 10
R2 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.81 0.87 0.82
 α 26229.31 -4255.86 -34375.15 -63074.92 -89857.77 -136085.64 -192699.06
b 1.07 1.11 1.16 1.21 1.25 1.34 1.48
Table 10 – R2 measure and regression analysis of local-currency liability 
estimate across term structure: Brazil
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
α -89857.77 68743.39 -1.3072 0.202186
LCLEstimate 1.2518 0.1161 10.7827 2.75E-05
R2 = 0.81 
Table 9 – Regression analysis for observed local-currency liability: Brazil 
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The most recent risk profile shows a “hump:” default probabilities first de-
crease (for maturities of up to five years) but then increase (conditional on 
no default occurring until 2017). This means that markets are expecting 
dampened reduced risk of default five years from June 2012 – probably 
due to an ease in political tensions and the reduced risk of deadlocked 
reform. But over the 10 year term they are anticipating greater risk. Inci-
dentally, Moody’s rating agency downgraded Italy’s rating by two notch-
es and subsequently downgraded 10 Italian banks in July 2011. Moody’s 
cited the usual fears related to the Eurozone’s debt crisis, along with the 
“increasing likelihood that greater collective support” will be needed for 
Italy. Usually an initial declining term structure denotes a high probability 
of default in the short run, due to a very poor economic situation.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate the quarterly time series of the sover-
eign balance sheet components. The distress barrier and implied asset 
value for periods prior to June 2006 lie precariously close, indicating an 
imminent default or risk thereof. Thereafter, the implied asset value ex-
periences a sharp spike, influenced by a sharp increase in the inverse 
leverage parameter obtained in the regime-switching model. This in turn 
leads to an overestimation in the local-currency liability estimate mean-
ing that CDS quotations overstate local sovereign liabilities. The model 
behavior of the observed local-currency liability mimics that observed 
when comparing the estimated default probability term structure to the 
bootstrapped equivalent.
Table 12 presents the results of the local-currency liability (LCL) estima-
tion and observation for a T= 5 year maturity and the corresponding value 
averaged across the entire term structure, together with the observed 
distress barrier and the estimated sovereign asset.
A case of Italy
Table 11 provides the calibrated parameters for Italy over a time period 
that extends from June 2008 to June 2012.
The high transition probability a11 of remaining in state 1 indicates a clear 
persistence in state 1 which according to the volatility estimate is clearly 
a high volatility state. The time pattern of the ratio S/K signals that Italy 
went through a very critical period up to June 2011 followed by the start 
of a recovery. This can also be appreciated by observing the calibrated 
term structure of the default probabilities in Figure 7.
What is observable is how perceived risk at a shorter time horizon jumped 
after April 2011, easing off towards the end of the estimation period. Dur-
ing this time Berlusconi’s government was in conflict over budget cuts 
and the default probability of the one-year horizon reached almost 8% 
from lows of 2%. Generally, the perceived riskiness of Italian sovereign 
debt rose over the entire maturity spectrum. Berlusconi’s government 
resigned in November 2011 and was replaced by one led by the former 
European Commissioner Mario Monti. The new government contained 
not a single party representative of elected parliamentarians and for this 
reason was defined as Technocratic. However, it received the full support 
of The Chamber of Deputies. Financial markets hailed Monti for restor-
ing Italy’s credibility by fixing the budget, starting an ambitious reform 
agenda, and for steering the country off the cliff of default. This is evident 
in our results: the volatility in the “bad” state declined steeply from 100% 
to a 40% low.
 s1 s2 a11 a12 S/K
30/06/2008 99.90% 1.42% 99.90% 99.75% 1.108532 
30/09/2008 99.90% 0.40% 99.90% 99.70% 1.028349 
31/12/2008 99.90% 0.39% 99.90% 99.75% 1.018536 
31/03/2009 99.14% 0.11% 99.90% 99.43% 1.006850 
30/06/2009 99.61% 0.25% 99.90% 99.57% 1.020102 
30/09/2009 99.90% 0.10% 99.90% 99.70% 1.004666 
31/12/2009 99.88% 0.12% 99.90% 99.47% 1.007596 
31/03/2010 99.90% 0.10% 99.90% 99.66% 1.005046 
30/06/2010 97.77% 1.50% 99.90% 99.90% 1.067598 
30/09/2010 95.38% 0.37% 99.90% 99.46% 1.019305 
31/12/2010 72.75% 0.20% 99.90% 98.98% 1.011849 
31/03/2011 99.90% 0.10% 99.90% 99.71% 1.003614 
30/06/2011 92.44% 0.33% 99.90% 99.14% 1.024536 
30/09/2011 85.37% 5.80% 99.90% 99.26% 1.275628 
30/12/2011 99.90% 11.11% 99.06% 99.77% 1.553669 
30/03/2012 41.69% 24.12% 67.70% 79.37% 2.166822 
29/06/2012 42.33% 35.93% 54.34% 66.90% 3.086906 
Table 11 – Estimated parameters for Markov regime-switching model: Italy
Figure 7 – Calibrated term structure of default probability: Italy
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Next, the quarterly predictive power for the observed local-currency li-
ability (LCL) over a T = 5 year maturity is examined in Table 13, using the 
estimated local-currency liability obtained from the model. The regres-
sion analysis produces the following estimates:
^
LCLObserved = 233434.82 + 0.35 ∗ LCLEstimate
The value of R2, the one-tailed t-statistic of 4.7 and the p-value < 0.05, 
suggests a moderate linear relationship between the model and the 
observed local-currency liability, and does however conclude a signifi-
cance in the estimated coefficients.
Table 14 shows the explanatory power of the estimated local-currency 
liability as measured by the R2 across the entire term structure. The re-
sults imply that, differently from the countries considered previously, the 
model used to estimate the LCL tend to improve in its ability to capture 
the variation in the observed balance sheet data as the maturity of the 
term structure increases.
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   Distress 
Barrier
Implied 
Asset 
Value 
LCL 
Observed 
LCL 
Estimate
(T=5)
Average 
LCL 
Estimate
30/06/2008 729,202 808,342 222,849 260,498 239,305
30/09/2008 748,828 770,057 277,605 249,385 221,367
31/12/2008 708,299 721,431 318,999 226,554 202,541
31/03/2009 753,850 759,014 343,891 256,392 226,451
30/06/2009 777,003 792,621 307,652 228,342 203,217
30/09/2009 816,334 820,146 326,721 268,907 235,747
31/12/2009 790,676 796,685 287,591 173,806 154,956
31/03/2010 838,388 842,622 361,719 280,812 247,478
30/06/2010 830,750 886,909 366,995 277,538 255,028
30/09/2010 836,599 852,754 356,730 285,615 254,903
31/12/2010 811,807 821,427 312,449 186,951 169,003
31/03/2011 812,795 815,729 355,788 278,443 242,821
30/06/2011 824,494 844,727 328,732 257,137 229,105
30/09/2011 746,986 952,878 388,206 473,777 448,480
30/12/2011 673,391 1,046,227 398,073 478,492 459,768
30/03/2012 677,325 1,467,641 434,547 546,608 515,622
29/06/2012 677,325 2,090,841 387,910 485,534 464,156
Table 12 – Implied sovereign asset value, distress barrier and local-
currency liability (in millions USD): Italy
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Figure 8 – Implied sovereign asset value versus distress barrier (in 
millions USD): Italy
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Figure 9 – Local-currency liability observed versus estimate (in millions 
USD): Italy
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
α 233434.82 24030.98 9.7139 7.31E-08
LCLEstimate 0.3467 0.07373 4.7023 0.000283
R2 = 0.60 
Table 13 – Regression analysis for observed local-currency liability: Italy
Maturity T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 T = 7 T = 10
R2 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.69
 α 238544.57 241620.00 241736.09 239143.01 233434.82 213021.46 151497.04
b 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.46 0.69
Table 14 – R2 measure and regression analysis of local-currency liability 
estimate across term structure: Italy 
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A case of the United States
For the United States, the estimation period includes quarterly data from 
June 2008 to June 2012. The estimated parameters across the entire 
term structure are presented in Table 15.
Persistence in state 1 of the model is evident from the results and ac-
cording to the volatility estimate, it can be classified as a high volatility 
state. The difference between s1 and s2 is indeed very large. The inverse 
leverage ratio fluctuates around 1.7, reaching levels of 2.4 over the esti-
mation period.
From Figure 10 we observe how the default probability has remained rel-
atively stable for shorter maturities while the perceived risk over a longer 
horizon has steadily increased over the estimation period. The probability 
of a default (PD) for the 10-year maturity has steadily risen from above 
1% to near 4%, fluctuating with the economic environment. We observe 
a wave-like behavior of the PD along the date axis, holding maturity con-
stant, particularly pronounced around December 2008 and July 2011.
On 15 June 2011, Dow Jones reported that the one-year CDS spread for 
the United States was at 43 basis points (higher than the 41 basis points 
spread for Brazil), and that the cost of insuring one-year US debt against 
default had risen on the back of concerns related to the debt ceiling. The 
potential of sovereign default or restructuring and concerns that Euro-
zone fiscal pressures could spread is reflected in the rise in perceived 
risk over the longer term.
The quarterly time series of the sovereign balance sheet components 
estimated according to the contingent claim approach for T= 5 year ma-
turity and the LCL averaged across the term structure are reported in 
Table 16.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 serve to illustrate the time series presented in 
Table 16. The value for the local-currency liability (LCL) estimate lies above 
the observed value indicating that the regime-switching method tends to 
overestimate the observed LCL. This means that sovereign CDS quota-
tions on US debt tend to overstate local sovereign liabilities. The implied 
sovereign asset value lies well above the distress value for all quarters sug-
gesting that no default was imminent in the estimation period. The peak 
and sudden drop in the implied asset value in 2011 highlight the sensitivity 
of the approach to the inverse leverage parameters estimated in the model. 
At this point, the leverage declined, volatility of the model fell sharply, and 
the transition probability of remaining in a high volatility state declined.
Next, the quarterly predictive powers for the observed local-currency li-
ability (LCL) over a five-year maturity is examined, using the estimated 
local-currency liability obtained from the model. The regression analysis 
estimates the following relationship:
^
LCLObserved = -654 618.21 + 1.13 ∗ LCLEstimate
The high value of R2 suggests that the regression model of the estimated 
local-currency liability explains the level in the observed counterpart very 
well. A one-tailed t-statistic of 7.4 indicates significance in the estimated 
coefficients. However, it appears biased: implied estimates are higher 
than observed.
 s1 s2 a11 a12 S/K
30/06/2008 99.90% 0.10% 99.00% 99.76% 1.5847 
30/09/2008 81.41% 0.15% 98.57% 99.60% 1.6992 
31/12/2008 72.04% 8.66% 99.90% 99.62% 1.6530 
31/03/2009 71.35% 8.03% 99.90% 99.63% 1.6572 
30/06/2009 99.90% 0.10% 99.18% 99.65% 1.5893 
30/09/2009 99.74% 1.91% 99.37% 99.76% 1.5648 
31/12/2009 67.95% 8.74% 99.90% 99.80% 1.6565 
31/03/2010 69.61% 8.57% 99.90% 99.75% 1.6529 
30/06/2010 68.13% 8.46% 99.90% 99.78% 1.6580 
30/09/2010 82.98% 9.67% 99.13% 99.64% 1.6361 
31/12/2010 56.23% 0.10% 98.23% 99.21% 1.9686 
31/03/2011 92.03% 6.46% 99.06% 99.67% 1.5511 
30/06/2011 81.00% 8.63% 99.90% 99.88% 1.5832 
30/09/2011 34.52% 0.10% 98.83% 98.88% 2.3708 
30/12/2011 73.38% 8.02% 99.90% 99.84% 1.6024 
30/03/2012 99.90% 0.10% 99.24% 99.59% 1.5931 
29/06/2012 71.40% 9.33% 99.78% 99.66% 1.6570 
Table 15 – Estimated parameters for Markov regime-switching model: US
Figure 10 – Calibrated term structure of default probability: US
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Table 18 shows the explanatory power of the estimated local-currency li-
ability as measured by the R2 across the entire term structure. The results 
in fact show an improvement in the predictive power of the model as we 
move toward the short end of the curve.
A case of Germany
In the case of Germany, the estimation period extends from June 2008 
to June 2012. The calibrated parameters across the entire term structure 
are presented in Table 19.
The striking difference with respect to the other countries is the low vola-
tility levels in the two states, reaching an upper level of around 25%. The 
high transition probability a11 of remaining in state 1 indicates persis-
tence in a low risk state economy. The inverse leverage parameter ranges 
between 1.6 and 2.
Figure 13 shows the term structure of probability of defaults (PDs) ob-
tained from the estimated PDs. The term structure from the start of the 
estimation period until around January 2009 is reasonably flat, indicating 
that perceived risk at the one to 10 year horizon is low and constant. After 
this period, the charts show how markets have changed their percep-
tion of Germany’s long-term prospects over the course of the remaining 
period. In two years, the probability of a default over the 10 year horizon 
climbs from below 2% to above 6% while the one to three year level re-
mained low. In July 2012, German 10-year debt did, in fact, reach record 
lows on the back of fear of a double dip recession in the US. In the same 
month, Moody’s lowered its outlook on Germany to negative.
The quarterly time series of the sovereign balance sheet components ac-
cording to the contingent claim approach for T= 5 year maturity and the 
LCL averaged across the term structure is reported in Table 20.
Figure 14 shows how the implied sovereign asset value lies well above the 
distress barrier for all quarters; analogous to a low probability less than 
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Distress 
Barrier
Implied 
Asset Value 
LCL 
Observed 
LCL 
Estimate
(T=5)
Average 
LCL 
Estimate
30/06/2008 21,590,625 34,213,671 741,504 1,828,238 1,640,256
30/09/2008 19,204,425 32,633,081 834,246 1,782,926 1,622,492
31/12/2008 19,063,457 31,511,456 1,549,762 1,619,281 1,567,835
31/03/2009 17,755,214 29,423,887 1,580,922 1,878,559 1,818,510
30/06/2009 18,880,466 30,006,668 1,626,160 1,842,701 1,793,222
30/09/2009 20,014,068 31,317,414 1,752,930 1,933,729 1,889,990
31/12/2009 19,730,396 32,682,887 1,952,025 2,121,046 2,075,346
31/03/2010 18,802,148 31,077,619 2,033,102 2,287,998 2,237,842
30/06/2010 17,112,212 28,371,244 1,977,475 2,211,521 2,168,214
30/09/2010 19,624,284 32,108,233 1,925,069 2,252,161 2,181,921
31/12/2010 19,349,739 38,091,916 1,970,157 2,283,386 2,223,695
31/03/2011 20,987,132 32,552,364 2,269,313 2,492,781 2,430,674
30/06/2011 21,338,182 33,782,801 2,503,646 2,597,764 2,562,947
30/09/2011 20,031,240 47,489,583 2,589,661 2,786,039 2,751,102
30/12/2011 19,506,948 31,258,363 2,598,679 2,820,027 2,789,482
30/03/2012 20,220,053 32,211,718 2,647,675 3,038,320 2,948,079
29/06/2012 19,420,762 32,180,281 2,606,872 3,013,467 2,923,294
Table 16 – Implied sovereign asset value, distressed barrier and local-
currency liability (in millions EUR): US
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Figure 11 – Implied sovereign asset value versus distress barrier (in 
millions EUR): US
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Figure 12 – Local-currency liability observed versus estimate (in millions 
EUR): US
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
α -654618.21 358446.60 -1.8263 0.8778
LCLEstimate 1.1417 0.1543 7.3980 2.23E-06
R2 = 0.79
Table 17 – Regression analysis for observed local-currency liability: US
Maturity T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 T = 7 T = 10
R2 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.79 0.64 0.15 
α 473684.52 143225.44 -188027.20 -489629.72 -654618.21 -249465.89 1405872.59
b 0.82 0.94 1.06 1.14 1.14 0.88 0.18
Table 18 – R2 measure and regression analysis of local-currency liability 
estimate across term structure: US
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8% of Germany defaulting over the estimation period. The implied asset 
value also fluctuates considerably from one quarter to the next as ob-
served in Figure 15, analogous to the variability observed in the calibrated 
inverse leverage parameter and indicative of the wave-like behavior ob-
served in the probability of default term structure. On the other side, the 
observed LCL remains quite stable over time. In practice, we observe that 
the local-currency liability estimate overstates the observed value across 
the term structure. This implies that the CDS quotations overstate local 
sovereign liabilities.
Next, the quarterly predictive power for the observed local-currency li-
ability (LCL) over a T= 5 year maturity is examined from the regression 
results obtained in Table 21, using the estimated local-currency liability 
obtained from the model. The following relationship is estimated:
^
LCLObserved = -326 508.18 + 0.05 ∗ LCLEstimate
The low value of R2 suggests that the regression model of the estimated 
local-currency liability explains very little variation in the observed coun-
terpart. A one-tailed t-statistic of 0.5 indicates that the estimated coef-
ficients are not significant.
Table 22 shows the explanatory power of the estimated local-currency 
liability as measured by the R2 across the entire term structure. The strik-
ing fact is that the one-year maturity already goes some way to predict-
ing the observed LCL value. In addition, this prediction appears to be 
unbiased.
 s1 s2 a11 a12 S/K
30/06/2008 2.17% 14.65% 0.9987 0.9985 2.1548 
30/09/2008 9.44% 1.33% 0.9982 0.9974 1.4759 
31/12/2008 0.60% 13.03% 0.9962 0.9906 1.6380 
31/03/2009 1.43% 21.35% 0.9990 0.9949 1.6084 
30/06/2009 1.23% 19.16% 0.9990 0.9975 1.5531 
30/09/2009 0.10% 20.93% 0.9990 0.9967 1.9859 
31/12/2009 0.21% 7.54% 0.9987 0.9951 1.7625 
31/03/2010 4.56% 13.97% 0.9988 0.9943 2.0623 
30/06/2010 4.65% 7.36% 0.9978 0.9920 1.6989 
30/09/2010 3.33% 15.13% 0.9979 0.9932 1.9507 
31/12/2010 0.82% 8.22% 0.9974 0.9898 1.4235 
31/03/2011 1.97% 11.64% 0.9969 0.9918 2.0313 
30/06/2011 0.86% 6.61% 0.9951 0.9938 1.1380 
30/09/2011 8.03% 17.86% 0.9986 0.9922 2.3000 
30/12/2011 2.78% 20.74% 0.9950 0.9917 1.4242 
30/03/2012 0.10% 20.81% 0.9972 0.9921 1.5405 
29/06/2012 2.80% 25.17% 0.9933 0.9878 1.8044 
Table 19 – Estimated parameters for Markov regime-switching model: 
Germany
Figure 13 – Calibrated term structure of default probability: Germany
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Figure 14 – Implied sovereign asset value versus distress barrier (in 
millions USD): Germany
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Figure 15 – Local-currency liability observed versus estimate (in millions 
USD): Germany
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Conclusion
Merton-style structural models provide a very appealing feature that links 
credit risk with underlying structural variables by providing an endog-
enous description of credit defaults and an intuitive economic interpreta-
tion. However, they suffer the disadvantage of leading to underestimates 
particularly over the short term. This research offers the potential to both 
resolve the underestimation inherent in most standard structural models 
and establish a link between the credit market and a sovereign’s balance 
sheet in an attempt to understand whether credit markets convey useful 
information that predicts economic stability. The methodology and ap-
plication backs the hypothesis that a regime-switching framework, which 
allows for structural shifts, can substantially improve default risk estima-
tors and can be tractably extended to a Contingent Claims Approach in 
the case of a sovereign, thereby obtaining a link between the credit mar-
ket and predictions of a sovereign’s balance sheet fundamentals.
The research analyses the economic impact of the estimated default 
probabilities on a sovereign’s balance sheet. Using the calibrated regime-
switching parameters extracted from the Markov-modulated model as 
inputs into the standard option pricing formula in the Merton Contingent 
Claim Approach, a sovereign asset value and local-currency liability in 
foreign currency terms (LCL) is extracted. The value of LCL is a call op-
tion of sovereign assets (A) with the strike price as the default barrier (B_f) 
defined as foreign-currency denominated debt. The LCL is observable in 
the market and facilitates a comparison with our estimate. We observe 
that under the regime-switching approach, the LCL estimate sufficiently 
captures the level in the observed LCL for all cases bar Germany. The 
regression results appear very good, albeit biased given non-zero inter-
cepts and betas not equal to 1. However, if we consider very short matur-
ities, predictions improve considerably, even for Germany. We speculate 
on the predictive ability of the model to balance sheet information shortly. 
First we identify that the LCL requirement according to the model is high-
er than the observed value for the case of South Africa, the US, and Ger-
many. Brazil and Italy, during certain periods require a lower LCL estimate 
than is observed in the market. Any under- or over-estimation of the LCL 
estimate relative to the observed value implies that the corresponding 
CDS market quotes, jointly with the model used, under- or over-estimate 
local sovereign liabilities respectively. We also observe the relation to the 
estimated inverse leverage ratio and the implied asset value. Inverse le-
verage ratios for the case of Italy are very low, showing signs of imminent 
default prior to 2011, therefore resulting in a low estimated value for the 
LCL for the relevant sample period. A low predicted inverse leverage pa-
rameter (close to 1) signifies imminent default and given the nature of the 
valuation of the LCL, significantly draws the required LCL lower than its 
observed counterpart.
In the August 2012 monthly bulletin of the European Central Bank (ECB), 
the linkages between structural, financial, and fiscal imbalances are cited 
  Distress 
Barrier
Implied 
Asset 
Value 
LCL 
Observed 
LCL 
Estimate
(T=5)
Average 
LCL 
Estimate
30/06/2008 5,629,811 12,131,255 332,105 766,000 714,543
30/09/2008 5,651,401 8,340,809 296,242 638,475 597,816
31/12/2008 4,869,564 7,976,342 314,663 345,243 337,972
31/03/2009 4,780,107 7,688,443 292,322 390,487 373,137
30/06/2009 4,986,103 7,744,088 304,066 369,280 358,438
30/09/2009 5,172,468 10,272,219 336,526 387,671 378,173
31/12/2009 5,248,690 9,250,694 341,680 386,837 376,706
31/03/2010 5,088,215 10,493,610 337,961 398,169 386,766
30/06/2010 4,915,667 8,351,017 329,289 383,128 372,209
30/09/2010 5,044,933 9,840,971 363,932 438,583 422,975
31/12/2010 5,306,088 7,553,110 408,009 504,486 482,842
31/03/2011 5,218,723 10,600,917 415,524 500,186 480,276
30/06/2011 5,556,759 6,323,703 405,900 486,315 466,626
30/09/2011 5,888,272 13,543,026 367,374 520,247 483,898
30/12/2011 5,550,577 7,905,355 352,365 464,870 437,941
30/03/2012 5,647,322 8,699,482 366,366 510,810 475,596
29/06/2012 5,662,888 10,218,330 349,963 524,980 480,244
Table 20 – Implied sovereign asset value, distressed barrier and local-
currency liability (in millions USD): Germany
  Coefficients Standard 
Error
t Stat P-value
α 326508.18 43320.09 7.5371 1.78E-06
LCLEstimate 0.04479 0.08862 0.5054 0.6206
R2 = 0.02
Table 21 – Regression analysis for observed local-currency liability: 
Germany
Maturity T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 T = 7 T = 10
R2 0.99 0.51 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.05 
α 0.00 115522.37 253870.81 301201.01 323006.38 350404.59 367717.41
b 1.00 0.63 0.24 0.11 0.05 -0.01 -0.04
Table 22 – R2 measure and regression analysis of local-currency liability 
estimate across term structure: Germany
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to have led to the sovereign debt crisis and the fragmentation of the 
financial markets, highlighting major weaknesses in the institutional set 
up of the European Monetary Union [ECB (2012)]. Structural rigidities 
and a build-up of imbalances resulted in more costly adjustments once 
the crisis erupted. The financial stability framework struggled to identify 
and correct systematic risk prior to the crisis and was equally challenged 
when containing the spread of instability across countries and markets 
when the risk materialised.
The model provided in this research provides a relative valuation frame-
work for contingent claims on a sovereign’s asset, estimating with a 
degree of caution, the balance sheet requirements necessary to predict 
default. In addition, Gray et al. (2007) suggests that the CCA approach 
could have implications on the rapidly growing sovereign wealth funds, 
particularly for emerging markets governments that have accumulated 
large reserves. Once sovereign risk exposures are calculated in a regime-
switching framework, new ways of transferring sovereign risk can be 
explored and new instruments and risk transfer arrangements can be 
developed.
Overall, there are several challenges when applying a contingent claim 
approach to a sovereign: the lack of any single dominant model, data re-
quirements that severely limit the scope of application for some models, 
and dependence of some models’ results on distributional assumptions. 
Furthermore, that market imperfections exist implies that non-market 
measures may add significant power in predicting default and balance 
sheet information beyond that possible even with an ideal contingent 
claims model. The results conclude that most sovereign’s observed LCL 
were estimated well enough by implementing the regime-switching pa-
rameters in a contingent claims approach. The regression analysis veri-
fies this. Germany proved to be a case where the explanatory power of 
the model is weak and the cause is evident on inspection of the implied 
asset value volatility i.e., volatility implied from the leverage parameter 
and not calibrated explicitly. Gray et al. (2007) attribute asset volatility to 
high levels of foreign exchange price volatility. This highlights the need to 
address the relationship and causality of asset value volatility and various 
risk indicators.
The following issues are left for future research. The research estimates 
the Markov model when the number of states is two. It would be better, 
however, to simultaneously estimate the optimal number of states with 
other parameters. Standard approaches applied to samples with few de-
faults pose some serious drawbacks which lead to a high probability of 
underestimating the true default probability (PD). These include the obvi-
ous effect of a high uncertainty estimation and skewness of the sampling 
distribution. Given the small probability of defaults and a small sample 
size observed in sovereign CDS data, any default event leading to a low 
PD estimate under standard approaches is unlikely. The likelihood of 
underestimation rises with a decrease in the true PD and a decrease in 
the sample size [Orth (2011)]. This could affect the regulatory approaches 
to risk management. Basel II states that where limited data are avail-
able, a bank must adopt a conservative bias to its analysis, adding to its 
estimates a margin of conservatism related to the likely range of errors 
– this applies equally in the case of the sovereign scenarios that we have 
described.
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Appendix 1
Applying a sovereign contingent claims approach
Random fluctuations in the market prices of an entity’s assets and liabili-
ties together with changes in financial inflows and outflows constitute 
balance sheet risk. If the total value of the assets falls below the level of 
promised payment on debt, distress and/or default occurs. The value of 
the risky debt is calculated as a default-free value of debt less an implicit 
put option on the underlying assets with the strike equal to the promised 
payments. Equity is modeled as an implicit call option with the same 
underlying asset and strike. The following balance sheet identity ensues:
Asset   = Equity + Liability 
= Implicit Call Option + Default-Free Debt – Implicit Put Option
The assets of a sovereign for the purpose of this approach comprise 
foreign reserves, net fiscal assets, and other assets minus entities too 
important to fail. Liabilities are defined as foreign-currency denominated 
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debt plus a local-currency liability comprised of local-currency debt and 
base money. Sovereign default arises when sovereign assets cannot suf-
ficiently cover the promised payment on foreign currency debt. The de-
fault barrier is therefore defined as the present value of these payments. 
The default barrier may be defined as a KMV-like measure (short-term 
debt plus one-half long-term debt plus interest payments up to a cer-
tain time) or “senior” foreign-currency denominated debt [Crouhy, et al. 
(2000)]. When a lender makes a loan to a sovereign, an implicit guarantee 
of that loan equal to the expected loss of default is created. The ac-
tion of the lender consists of pure default-free lending and bearing a risk 
of default by the sovereign. Risky debt can be viewed as a contingent 
claim on the (stochastic) sovereign assets. The foreign-currency debt can 
therefore be modeled as default-free value of debt minus an implicit put 
option. Local-currency liabilities are modeled as an implicit call option 
since such liability demonstrates “equity-like features” on a sovereign 
balance sheet. Excessive issue of both the money base and local-cur-
rency liabilities have a similar effect on inflation and price changes as the 
excessive issuing of corporate shares dilute shareholders’ claims. The 
local-currency multiplied by the exchange rate is considered a market 
cap of the sovereign in the international market.
The main challenge is deriving an estimate for the market value and vola-
tility of sovereign assets. Because these are not directly observable, the 
CCA approach relies on the relationship between balance sheet entries 
to extract an implied estimate of sovereign assets by a calibration pro-
cedure. The value of the local-currency liability in foreign currency terms 
(LCL) is a call option of the sovereign’s assets (A) with the strike price as 
the default barrier (Bf) defined as foreign-currency denominated debt. 
The standard approach requires two equations: the first defines LCL as a 
call option on the asset value
LCL = AN(d1) – Bfe–rfT N(d2) (2)
 
(3)
The second equation defines the volatility of the LCL through
LCL*sLCL = AsA N(d1) (4)
while sA is the volatility of the sovereign’s assets.
The formula for the local currency liability in foreign currency which is 
observed directly from market data is defined as
LCL = M + Bd,FC = 
(MLCe–rdT+Bd)e–rfT
XF  
(5)
where
MLC  - is the base money in local-currency terms
M  - is the base money in foreign-currency terms
rd  - is the domestic interest rate
rf  - is the foreign interest rate
Bd  - is the domestic currency denominated debt
Bd,FC  -  is the domestic currency denominated debt in foreign currency 
terms
XF - is the forward exchange rate
sA - is the volatility of the sovereign assets
Equation (2) and (4) are typically used to calculate the unknown and 
unobservable sovereign asset value and asset volatility. The calibrated 
parameters can be used to obtain sovereign risk measures such as dis-
tance-to-default and probability of default and spreads on debt.
Here we follow a different procedure. Instead of pricing CDSs or evalu-
ating the value of balance sheet claims according to a CCA model, we 
use observed market data, filter it through the regime-switching model 
and we try to infer balance sheet information by performing a reverse 
engineering procedure: we use the calibrated parameters of the regime 
switching model to bootstrapped PDs in order to estimate the local-
currency liabilities in foreign currency terms (LCL) as a call option on a 
sovereign’s assets (A) with the strike price as the default barrier (Bf). An 
estimation of the sovereign unknown and unobserved asset value (Aˆ) can 
be extracted from both the calibrated inverse leverage parameter (S/K) 
and the observed distress barrier (Bf) such that
Aˆ = 
S
K  
* Bf    (6)
The underlying risky asset (S) and the strike (K) in the regime-switching 
framework equates to the sovereign asset value (A) and threshold barrier 
(Bf). Similarly, the inverse leverage parameter (S/K) equates to the ratio of 
the sovereign asset value (A) to the default threshold (A/Bf).
The use of the Merton-type model requires many balance sheet inputs 
and parameters which are not always clearly observed and can some-
times be inaccurate or difficult to obtain. By reverse engineering the valu-
ation of a sovereign’s asset value, the model requires substantially less 
market information and adjusts for any structural breaks in the model in 
an attempt to improve the fair value estimates of a sovereign’s balance 
sheet.
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